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C O M M E R C E  &  T R A D E
Tesla motors, the offspring of entrepreneur elon musk (who brought us Pay-Pal and spaceX), is the most exciting automo-tive development in many decades and a marquee story of American technological dynamism and innovation. The company’s luxury electric cars have caused a sensation 
in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports call-
ing Tesla’s model s the best car it ever tested. 
Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges in pen-
etrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a 
century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build 
cars that customers want to drive (and ultimately produce them 
cost-effectively), but it must build the battery-swapping and 
charging infrastructure that makes charging as easy and reliable 
as pumping gas. Those are tall orders.
But Tesla’s research and development, technological, and infra-
structure challenges seem to be dwarfed these days by political 
challenges mounted by the powerful car dealers’ lobby. Tesla has 
chosen a direct-to-consumer distribution model, one that bypasses 
traditional franchised dealer networks. The carmaker is operating 
its own showrooms and interacting with consumers directly over 
the Internet. Not surprisingly, that model has struck a deeply nega-
tive chord with car dealers who prefer not to be cut out of the action. 
The dealers have responded by invoking decades-old laws aimed at 
curbing direct distribution by car manufacturers, and seeking new 
legislative or regulatory decisions aimed at closing any loopholes 
that might allow Tesla to distribute directly. Thus far, the dealers 
have succeeded in blocking Tesla in states like Texas, south Caro-
lina, and New Jersey, and are continuing to mount their campaign 
on a state-by-state level as the company tries to grow its footprint.
Daniel a. Cr ane is associate Dean for Faculty and research and the Frederick 
Paul Furth Sr. Professor of law at the University of Michigan.
The dealers have been successful largely because of their politi-
cal clout in local elections, where they make significant campaign 
contributions. They have attempted to justify the direct distribu-
tion bans as a form of consumer protection and public safety 
regulation. slowly, consumers are waking up to the fact that the 
dealers’ arguments are completely unfounded. Consumer protec-
tion and public safety have nothing to do with those restrictions; 
they are protectionism for car dealers, pure and simple.
OriginS OF aUtOMOtive  
DiStribUtiOn reStriCtiOnS
state laws restricting direct distribution of automobiles are not a 
new phenomenon. They grew out of intensive lobbying efforts by 
car dealers in the 1930s–1950s, in response to perceived abuses 
of the franchise relationship by car manufacturers. At that time, 
the car companies were large, powerful, and few in number. 
manufacturers would secure contracts that imposed draconian 
terms on the dealers. According to a 1956 u.s. senate commit-
tee report, franchise agreements of the 1950s typically did not 
require the manufacturer to supply the dealer with any inventory 
and allowed the manufacturer to terminate the dealer at will 
without any showing of cause. Conversely, the manufacturers 
could often force dealerships to accept cars whether the dealers 
could sell them or not. Thus, the franchise agreements were per-
ceived as shifting risk downward to dealers and reward upward 
to the manufacturer. Ford and General motors, in particular, 
were accused of using their superior economic leverage to play 
extreme hardball with the dealers.
The dealers made some headway in the courts challenging 
the franchise agreements as contracts of adhesion—that is, con-
tracts in which one side has all the bargaining power and uses 
that power to its advantage. But the relief the dealers ultimately 
Tesla and The  
Car dealers’ lobby
Will an innovative, new carmaker bring about a long-overdue  
change to the automobile industry?
✒ by Daniel a. Crane
anticompetitive or anticonsumer practices, such as “padding” 
new car prices, price fixing, and “packing” finance charges (i.e., 
charging fees without the buyer’s knowledge)—not the news the 
dealers wanted. 
eventually, the dealers secured a modest federal victory with 
the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act of 1956, which allows 
dealers to bring a federal suit against a manufacturer who, without 
good faith, fails to comply with the terms of a franchise agreement 
or terminates, cancels, or refuses to renew a franchise.
needed was legislative. During the 1930s–1950s, the dealers 
pressured Congress to enact a statutory scheme protecting the 
dealers, but they got relatively little of what they wanted. A 
1940 study by the Federal Trade Commission, which had been 
encouraged by the car dealers, did find some franchising abuses 
by manufacturers, but the report’s headline was that the use 
of manufacturer power to squeeze the dealers actually created 
intense retail competition, to the benefit of consumers. The FTC 
also turned the tables on the dealers and accused them of various 
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c o M M e r c e  &  t r a D e
The dealers secured more significant victory in state legis-
latures. During the 1940s–1950s, states began to pass statutes 
governing automotive franchise relations. Today, such laws are on 
the books in all 50 states. Their terms vary, but they commonly 
include prohibitions on forcing dealers to accept unwanted cars, 
protections against termination of franchise agreements, and 
restrictions on granting additional franchises in a franchised 
dealer’s relevant market area.
The statutory provisions that trouble Tesla prohibit a manu-
facturer from distributing its cars directly to consumers, effec-
tively requiring the manufacturer to deal exclusively through 
dealers. The legislative concern reflected in those statutes is that 
if a manufacturer integrated forward into distribution, it might 
compete unfairly with its own franchised dealers by undercut-
ting them on price. As discussed below, if that concern was ever 
legitimate, it seems much less so in the current world of vigorous 
competition among a large number of manufacturers. But the 
key point is that the concern should not apply to Tesla or any 
other car manufacturer that wants to avoid franchising alto-
gether. At most, if one were worried about “undercutting” by the 
manufacturer, the rule should be a prohibition on manufacturer 
retail operations for manufacturers that also franchise, not for 
those that bypass franchising altogether. Nonetheless, the deal-
ers have thus far enjoyed success in utilizing the prohibitions to 
block direct distribution that bypasses dealers.
alOng COMeS the internet
With the advent of the Internet, manufacturers began to see the 
opportunities to deal more efficiently with consumers by allow-
ing buyers to place direct Internet orders for new cars. A 2009 
research paper by a Justice Department economist, citing a 2000 
Goldman sachs report, estimated that the cost savings to con-
sumers from direct distribution could be as great as $2,225 per 
vehicle, or 8.6 percent of the vehicle cost. The report explained 
that “[t]he components of those savings were as follows: $832 
from improvement in matching supply with consumer demand; 
$575 from lower inventory; $387 from fewer dealerships; $381 
from lower sales commissions and $50 from lower overall ship-
ping costs.” The Justice report also pointed to a real-world exam-
ple of significant consumer savings from direct distribution in 
Brazil, where such distribution is legal:
since 2000, customers in Brazil can order the Celta over the 
internet from a site that links them with Gm’s assembly plant 
and 470 dealers nationwide. By 2006, 700,000 Celtas had been 
produced and the car continues to be one of Brazil’s best sell-
ers. Consumers have 20 “build-combinations” from which to 
configure a model of their choice, including colors and accesso-
ries, and can view each change as it is being made. Gm built five 
distribution centers throughout Brazil to reduce transportation 
time from its assembly plant and buyers can track location of 
their car online on its way to delivery at a dealer of their choice. 
The time from configuration at the factory to delivery is only 
about a week, in contrast to the several week wait that can be 
common in ordering a car in the united states.
Predictably, u.s. dealers were no more sympathetic to Internet 
distribution than they were to manufacturers setting up their 
own showrooms. They put pressure on state motor vehicle com-
missions to shut down Internet sales. In 1999, the Texas motor 
Vehicle Division shut down efforts by Ford 
to sell preowned vehicles over the Internet. 
The Texas statute made it illegal for anyone 
to serve as an automobile dealer in the state 
without a license and then made it illegal 
for manufacturers to obtain a license. In 
2001, the u.s. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit upheld that restriction against con-
stitutional challenge.
The manufacturers’ frustrated efforts 
to deal directly kept a relatively low pro-
file until Tesla burst onto the scene several 
years ago. The combination of Tesla’s revolutionary new technol-
ogy, the flamboyance of musk, and his decision to bypass dealers 
altogether thrust the issue into the national spotlight.
FOUnDatiOnal eCOnOMiCS OF DiStribUtiOn
Before getting into the dealers’ arguments in favor of direct dis-
tribution bans, let us recall a few preliminaries on the econom-
ics of distribution. Distribution is merely one of the functions 
that a firm can decide to perform internally or else purchase 
on the market. As ronald Coase observed in his 1937 article 
“The Nature of The Firm,” whether a company performs such 
services internally or buys them on the market is a question of 
the agency and transactions costs of those respective forms of 
distribution. 
There are many reasons why manufacturers might prefer to 
distribute through independent dealers. It shifts the investment 
in distribution to someone other than the manufacturer, allow-
ing the manufacturer to focus on its core competence in research 
and development and manufacturing. It shifts distribution deci-
If legislators were truly worried about carmakers  
undercutting franchisees, then the law would prohibit  
carmakers from having both direct retailing and  
franchising, instead of just prohibiting direct retail sales.
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sions to managers with local market knowledge. It may create 
economies of scale or scope as dealers sell several different brands 
under a single roof.
But there are also good reasons why a manufacturer might 
prefer to sell directly to consumers. The manufacturer may be 
concerned that the dealers will focus more on short-term sales 
maximization than long-term investment in building the brand. 
That could be particularly worrisome for a company like Tesla 
that is introducing a disruptive new technology that still needs to 
be proven in the market. sales of the new brand may cannibalize 
dealer revenues earned from selling other brands, lowering their 
incentive to invest in promoting the new brand. manufacturers 
may also fret that local dealers will be unsophisticated about new 
technologies and that training and monitoring will be easier if 
retail distribution stays in house. 
There is no a priori reason to favor one model or the other. 
some companies choose to distribute their goods only through 
independent dealers. Others, like Apple, follow a dual distribution 
path, distributing their products through both their own outlets 
and independent retailers. Finally, some firms prefer to do all of 
their own distribution. Competition in the market should inform 
firms whether they have chosen the optimal strategy or should 
rethink their distribution decision. But there is no reason for 
legislators or regulators to favor one method or the other.
Dealer argUMentS in FavOr  
OF reStriCteD DiStribUtiOn
since Tesla has shone an unflattering spotlight onto the deal-
ers’ favored regulations, the dealers have been busy explaining 
themselves. Alas, their arguments are so problematic that they 
only serve to bolster the view that the restrictions are pure pro-
tectionism.
The dealers’ leading argument is that banning direct dis-
tribution is a form of “consumer protection.” They argue that 
creating “competition” in retail distribution of cars is neces-
sary to prevent manufacturers from price-gouging customers. 
But the idea that a vertically integrated manufacturer has a 
“monopoly” over the brand’s retail distribution that needs to 
be broken up by outsourcing the retail function to indepen-
dent dealers is farcical. As economists have long understood, 
if a manufacturer has market power, it will extract the full 
monopoly profit regardless of whether it sells to dealers or 
end users. It will be fully embedded in either the wholesale 
or retail price. since retail distribution is just a cost of doing 
business, Tesla will increase its monopoly profits by minimiz-
ing the cost of retail distribution because then it will sell more 
cars. If anything, outsourcing the retail distribution function 
to locally dominant automobile dealers could lead to double 
marginalization and increased prices. Hence, as the supreme 
Court has repeatedly noted in the vertical restraints context, 
the interests of consumers and manufacturers are aligned in 
disfavoring dealer market power. Neither Tesla nor any other 
manufacturer can increase its profits by adding a monopoly 
markup to the retail price. Thus, if retail price competition is 
the concern, we should be far more concerned about the incen-
tives of dealers than manufacturers.
The dealers also argue that having local dealers is necessary to 
ensure that customers are adequately served. For example, Bob 
Glaser of the North Carolina Automobile Dealers’ Association 
has asserted that the restrictions are a form of “consumer pro-
tection” because “a dealer who has invested a significant amount 
of capital in a community is more committed to taking care of 
that area’s customers.” The obvious rejoinder is that Tesla and 
other manufacturers have as much interest as the dealers—if not 
more—in seeing that customers get the level of service that they 
are willing to pay for. If Tesla gets a bad reputation for quality, it 
will fail and never recoup the billions of dollars it is investing in 
creating new technologies. Car manufacturers make considerably 
larger brand-specific fixed capital investments than do dealers, and 
hence have greater incentives to protect the long-term integrity 
of the brand.
The dealers also argue that the restrictions are necessary for 
public safety. The dealers have pounced on recent news that Gm 
failed to recall certain vehicles with safety problems, leading to 
tragic losses of life. But it is hard to understand how that episode 
supports the arguments against direct distribution; those failures 
to issue safety recalls occurred while Gm was distributing through 
traditional dealer networks. The dealers argue that product recalls 
are a cost to manufacturers, whereas they are an opportunity to 
dealers to earn income. But that argument is false. Dealers do not 
make the decision to issue safety recalls. Those decisions come 
from the manufacturer and the National Highway Traffic safety 
Administration. Once a safety recall has been issued, either a dealer 
or the manufacturer can service it.
Tellingly, I am unaware of any consumer group supporting 
the dealers’ consumer protection arguments. That leaves one last 
major category of argument for the dealers: independent dealers 
are civic bastions of local communities and therefore deserve 
to be specially protected. Whether that is true—and whether 
the dealers make better philanthropic citizens than would any 
other economic special interest granted a protected position—is 
entirely speculative. But if the model of direct distribution is 
so superior to franchised distribution that eliminating legal 
protections would put the dealers out of business, then there 
must be something systematically inefficient about franchised 
distribution. In that case, both consumers and local communi-
ties would be better served if state legislatures just levied a tax 
on auto sales and distributed the money pro rata to local civic 
organizations.
SeleCtive exeMPtiOnS anD CrOny CaPitaliSM
since direct distribution bans seem impossible to justify on any 
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rational economic grounds, both the dealers and some other 
manufacturers have turned the argument into one against 
favoritism for Tesla. For example, as Ohio was recently con-
sidering legislation that would create a special direct-dealing 
exemption for Tesla, Gm wrote a public letter to Ohio Gov. 
John Kasich (r) complaining about the proposed legislation. 
What was most telling about Gm’s letter was its straightforward 
admission that allowing Tesla to engage in direct distribution 
would give the carmaker a “distinct competitive advantage” 
and would create a “significant dis-
parate impact” on competition in the 
auto industry. That is tantamount to 
a confession that direct distribution is 
more efficient. If Tesla will gain a com-
petitive advantage by bypassing dealers, 
shouldn’t we want all car companies to 
have that same advantage?
Gm is quite right in complaining that 
permission to engage in direct distribu-
tion should not become a special privilege 
that is handed out through backroom 
deals. That would just further the anticompetitive and anticon-
sumer distortions created by the sort of crony capitalism the 
dealers have already succeeded in implementing. rather, direct 
distribution should be an option available to all manufacturers.
That brings the argument back full circle to the original 
purpose of the state direct distribution prohibitions: preventing 
manufacturers from competing with their own franchised deal-
ers. Apart from the frivolous consumer protection arguments, 
should there still be a concern that manufacturers will take 
unfair advantage of their dealers by undercutting them on price 
at retail? even if that argument had some validity at a time when 
the Big Three Detroit manufacturers controlled the entire u.s. 
market, it has none today. There are now seven large manufac-
turers selling over 100,000 units a month in the u.s. market and 
many smaller manufacturers with significant sales. Dealers have 
a choice of manufacturers for whom to distribute and therefore 
significantly greater clout in franchise negotiations. many dealer-
ships are no longer small mom-and-pop organizations but large 
multi-location and even multi-state ventures. The dealers should 
protect their interests through contractual negotiations rather 
than through protectionist legislation.
the POlitiCS OF getting it right
Public choice theory teaches that small groups of people with 
a large economic interest in protectionist legislation will often 
be successful at implementing such regulations if the costs 
are spread over a broad group of consumers, none of whom 
has a sufficient individual interest in seeking to overturn the 
legislation. such theories explain the persistence of the direct 
distribution bans in the face of evidence that they are harmful 
to consumer welfare and completely unrelated to their osten-
sible justifications.
There are signs, however, the dealers’ grip may be slipping. 
Tesla sees direct distribution as critical to the success of its busi-
ness model and appears to be settling in for a long ground war. 
In the meantime, voices from across the political spectrum have 
pointed out the absurdities of the direct distribution bans. In 
march, I spearheaded an open letter about New Jersey’s ban to 
Gov. Chris Christie (r). The 72 distinguished economists and law 
professors who signed the letter come from across the political 
spectrum and make an unusual coalition, but they are unified in 
explaining these laws as anticonsumer protectionism. since the 
Tesla story gained momentum in national news media, several 
of the leading contenders for the 2016 republican presidential 
nomination as well as prominent politicians from both parties 
have publicly announced support for allowing direct distribution. 
The dealers surely will not give up easily, but the opposition is 
strengthening.
Direct distribution of cars has emerged as a national political 
issue because of the environmental and technological salience of 
electric cars and tremendous appeal of the Tesla brand. similar 
stories occasionally emerge when a sympathetic or quirky set of 
facts makes a compelling story, as when a group of Louisiana 
monks successfully sued for the right to make and distribute 
caskets against the self-interested wishes of the Louisiana state 
Board of embalmers and Funeral Directors. regrettably, many 
industries remain bound by protectionist rules designed to insu-
late the industry incumbents from competition. Car manufactur-
ers should have the right to choose the most efficient means of 
distribution, and so should everyone else.
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